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A formative plurality is identified in the 
constitution of international law. This 
plurality embeds resistance yet also blocks it 
by enabling a neo-imperial enclosing of 
international law. Ultimately, however, law’s 
plurality can render the enclosure provisional 
and secure the possibility of resistance. 
 
 
How much can come 
                                                          And much can go, 
      And yet abide the World! 
(Emily Dickinson, “There came a Wind like a Bugle”)1 
                                                 
*
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Inter gentes 
 As a prefiguring of international law, the ius inter gentes poses a persistent puzzle: 
how can the “inter-” of international law be realized? A touch of semantics may help set the 
issue. In English, and as the Oxford English Dictionary has it, the prefix “inter-“ denotes 
being “[b]etween or among other things or persons; between the parts of, in the intervals of, 
or in the midst of, something; together with;” and it extends as well to being “with each other; 
mutually, reciprocally... .”2 So, in many of its numerous composites, “inter-“ denotes not only 
relations between distinct entities but also a “something” with-in which that relation subsists. 
The “international” of international law provides a convenient instance. Likewise the Latin 
inter would accommodate being between or among, and so the ius inter gentes becomes a law 
between or among peoples; and Latin would extend also to inter being “in the midst 
of...something.” Aptly then, the ius inter gentes would also be in itself a “something” of 
surpassing singularity (and the word ‘something’ will now carry a loaded meaning 
throughout). The puzzle then becomes how this something can be both singular yet 
constituted in a formative plurality of peoples.  
 Initially of course the Roman empire seemed to oblige and tip the scales very much in 
the direction of a surpassing singularity. And it was Roman law which initially bestowed 
influential renditions of ius inter gentes within an occidental ‘modernity.’ The telling figure 
here is Francisco de Vitoria. He will take on further prominence later but for now it may be 
sufficient to observe how “Vitoria argued that the ius gentium of the Roman texts, in which it 
meant the law shared by all peoples, should be understood also as ius inter gentes, that is, a 
set of rules governing the relations between one people and another.”3 With Vitoria in the 
sixteenth century, this ius gentium fused scholastic theology and an assertive secularism, and 
this was done in a way, and in a setting, that enshrined an occidental imperialism.
4
 Aptly, 
                                                 
2
  Oxford English Dictionary, CD ROM Version 4.0, Second Edition, “Inter-, prefix,” meanings 1a and 1b 
(emphasis in original). 
3
  Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 94-95. 
4
  Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, translated 
by G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2003) Part II chapters 2 and 3: Antony Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) chapter 
1. 
4 
 
Vitoria and the advent of this imperium can be seen as layering a further imperial origin on 
international law. That further origin is fraught, however. 
  Such an origin no longer provides a specifically imperial and unitary authority. We 
are now the denizens of “unseen empires,” as Pope Francis has it -- empires operating 
through “uniform systems of economic power.”5 The significance of these unseen empires for 
international law will be teased out later, but with such law in its conventional conception a 
specific unitary authority would seem to be not only absent but impossible. In contrast to the 
absence of fixed internal boundaries in the Roman empire, in the early modern period of 
occidental history, and as Schmitt notes, “the territorial order of the ‘state’...became the 
representative of a new order in international law.”6 And, he would add,  “[o]nly as a 
consequence of the clear demarcation of self-contained territories did jus gentium become 
distinctly and clearly jus inter gentes [law among nations], inter gentes Europaeas [among 
nations of Europe].”7 For this international law, Vattel provided the classic and compact 
claim that, in and as international law, there remains an “unlimited and unconditional power” 
of the sovereign state, so that none of the member states of the international “yield...rights to 
the general body,” each sovereign state being somehow “independent of all the others.”8 Yet 
it is quite impossible for there to be any commonality, any community, of entities each 
possessed of such an ultimate completeness. Adapting Nancy, with such a pure plurality any 
formed relation between nations would instead have to be in “communion,” a communion 
formed by reference to “a divine presence” or, it could be added, by reference to a deific 
substitute such as an imperial national sovereignty or the ‘community’ of ‘the international 
community.’9  
        If we cannot accept the abstracted completeness of the nation-state or the evasive 
transcendence of this ‘international community,’ then we have to account for the coherence 
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of international law in other terms. The same challenge can be put more pointedly if we break 
down the category that gets called general international law and seek the formative force of 
its more particular manifestations, such as the formative force of jus cogens, an ‘imperative 
law’ of international law which cannot be countered by nation-states; or the formative force 
of an international criminal law seemingly lacking the singular sovereign voice; or the 
formative force that goes to constitute a distinct international customary law. With each of 
these, as well as other, formations of international law there is something that is not contained 
within a consensual pantheon of nation-states, something distinctly beyond that, yet 
something more cohering and coherent, more actualized than a pure plurality, a simple 
diversity. The inescapable challenge now becomes what this ‘something’ may be. 
 International 
      Whatever else international law may be it would not seem to be international. Returning 
to the story so far, international law emerges from an imperial and religious precursor into a 
supposedly secular jus publicum Europaeum, and there is cogent confirmation that 
international law still persists as a “European tradition,” with this Europe being 
“representative of the universal.”10 Linking then and now, the standard “history of 
international law has been written so far...as a history of rules developed in the European 
state system since the 16th century which then spread to other continents and eventually the 
entire globe.”11 This is a monistic history, an extraversion of a self-contained Europe or, in 
terms of another disciplinary designation, this is the product of a European cognitive 
geography that is supremely singular. Despite, then, its “regional dimension” international 
law still sustains “the label of universality.”12 Being determinately regional yet intrinsically 
of the universal it does pose a considerable contradiction for a modern, secular international 
law. As such, this law cannot project its universality from a persistent position of surpassing 
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transcendence. That universality has, then, to be immanent to international law – to its 
delimited “regional” self. Yet, as Deleuze and Guattari would observe, “...whenever 
immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can be sure that this Something 
reintroduces the transcendent.”13 
Closer acquaintance with this “Something” refines rather than resolves contradiction. 
As we saw earlier, and in terms of Vattel’s classic formula, international law was set as an 
emanation of nation-states, each having and retaining a completeness of power. And as 
Bauman would deduce, “in a world fully and exhaustively divided into national domains, 
there was no space left for internationalism.”14 Yet for there to be an international law nation-
states have to relate concordantly to each other. Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 
1931 includes in its criteria for qualifying as “a person of international law...a capacity to 
enter into relation with other States.” And of course that convention itself is a creation of 
states relating to each other. All of which would accord an aptness, as far as international law 
is concerned, to such phrases as ‘the international community’ and ‘the community of 
nations’ but, as we saw earlier in the company of Vattel, this is an impossible community. 
Entirely independent entities cannot relate in and as community. They relate, if at all, in and 
as a quasi-deific,  transcendent communion.  
It may be wondered how such self-sufficient entities need have, or even would have, 
the extensive capacity to recognise each other at all. In the scholarship of international law 
there are two well-worn yet still warring theories of ‘recognition.’ With the more approved 
declaratory or evidentiary theory, the nation-state “exists as such prior to and independently 
of recognition,” recognition then being “merely a formal acknowledgment of an established 
situation or fact.”15 Beyond immediate concerns with international law, the self-subsistence 
of either facticity or of any particular fact is something intensely contested. But, even putting 
that on one side, there remains the question of how there can be definitive content given to 
the particular ‘fact’ of something being a nation-state. The sovereign nation-state, in its self-
constituted utter distinctness, cannot defer to another authority laying down the criteria for 
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the very recognition of that distinctness. The contrast then with the alternative theory of 
recognition, the constitutive theory, could not be sharper. With this theory, recognition 
creates the nation-state in accord with criteria laid down in international law – criteria such as 
those contained in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention of 1933. So, nation-states are 
constituted by an international law which they constitute. 
There can be little reticence in an international law that persistently elevates its own 
surpassing credentials. So, international law’s identifying itself with ‘the international 
community’ or ‘the community of nations’ is rarely a matter of self-restraint. The same could 
be said of the burgeoning presence of human rights in international law and the 
commensurate claims to the human in such as ‘crimes against humanity.’ International 
criminal law itself can stand apart from the exceptionally limited consensual adherence of 
states, propound an ‘international legal personality” and proscribe “‘universal’ or 
international crimes” – dictates that in practice have “allowed of few or no reservations.”16 
Rules in international criminal law will overlap with the domain of jus cogens, that domain of 
peremptory norms of international law binding on every state whether or not it has agreed to 
them. In a like vein, there are obligations erga omnes, obligations deemed to be “towards all” 
in that the obligation is one “to the whole of the international community” in requiring, for 
example, the “enforcing and protecting [of] fundamental human rights.”17 Furthermore, no 
matter what the difficulty in theorizing its ‘recognition,’ a “state may exhibit all the hallmarks 
of statehood yet be denied recognition by other states by reason of the circumstances of its 
creation offending fundamental norms of the international legal order.”18 
Perhaps the most extensive, if comparatively subdued, claim international law would 
advance in its self-elevation takes the form of custom. Once seen as the very foundation of 
international law, custom remains central and pervasive. This is not custom as a mordant 
stasis. Although typically taken to be derived from the ‘practice’ of states, custom is 
receptively and continually formative of that practice, and it is selectively transformative in 
its recognizing practice as juridical rule. The court in effecting these processes of formation 
and transformation is not limited in its range of enquiry – an enquiry that can extend to, for 
example, “treaties, the practice of states, diplomatic correspondence, decisions of state courts, 
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  Ilias Bantekas, International Criminal Law, Fourth Edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 2, 8, 14. 
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  Ibid at 13. 
18
  Shearer, International Law, supra note 15 at 87. 
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and juristic writings.”19 The impact of custom can, in turn, be transformative of other 
categories of international law such as treaties and decisions of international courts. Here the 
formative force of custom merges with that of legal interpretation and determination 
generally where international law routinely manifests its prescriptive elevation, at times 
spectacularly so as with the invention and formulation of crimes against humanity.
20
 
In all, this engagement with the international of international law seems to have ended 
in intimations of aporia. Borrowing Carty’s terms, there is “a void at the very heart of 
international society which is marked by the myth of international legal order;” in the result, 
“there is no legal solidarity on the part of states towards one another.”21 Yet, our engagement 
went on, international law had a generative force and determinate efficacy that seemed able 
to fill any such void. En route to resolving this seeming contradiction, the next section looks 
at attempted appropriations of international law that might be considered able to resolve it. 
Appropriation 
The history of modern international law and its expansion touched on earlier can be 
endowed with impelling content by way of Anghie’s supplement: “European International 
law could not have become universally applicable if not for colonialism. Colonialism 
justified itself as a civilizing mission.”22 That history derived an origin from “rules developed 
in the European state system since the 16
th
 century.”23 More specifically the Hispanic 
colonization of the Americas in that century is widely seen as providing another yet related 
origin – the origin of a unitary comprehension of the world vested in Europe, and this not as a 
matter of perspective only but also as a matter of pending entitlement, an entitlement 
beginning with “the New World, America, the land of freedom, i.e. land free for 
appropriation by Europeans.”24 That acerbic note provided by Schmitt is reproduced in one of 
his comments on Vitoria’s lectures on the occupation of this New World: 
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  Anthony Carty, “Myths of International Legal Order: Past and Present” (1997) 10:2 Cambridge Review of 
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It never occurred to the Spanish monk that non-believers should have the same 
rights of propaganda and intervention for their idolatry and religious fallacies as 
Spanish Christians had for their Christian missions.
25
 
Whilst that imperial orientation could hardly be expected to have endured into a post-
colonial era, it has. For a start, somewhat literally, former colonies entered an international 
domain that continued, with only marginal modification, to be amply occupied by an 
Occident now expanded beyond Europe in the absorption of the United States. This entry was 
not only a matter of being admitted into international institutions, international law itself 
remained securely ‘in place’ commanding adherence. Even those not colonized were 
admitted on the same terms, or lack of terms, and at times earlier. So, Anghie describes “the 
arduous task successfully undertaken by Japan” and by some others as one of securing 
admission to the domain of international law “by changing their social, political, economic 
and legal systems in such a manner as to ensure that they complied with European 
standards.”26 
This particular ‘new international law’ is one enmeshed, returning to Pope Francis, in 
“unseen empires” where “uniform systems” are to be realized, not now as the emanation of 
some imperium, but through generating commonalities of requisite effect –  generating an 
“imperialism of the same,” as Levinas may render it, whilst still sustaining an insistent 
differentiation.
27
 With this more “informal imperialism,” borrowing Tully’s depiction,28 those 
not presently or entirely of the elect are to undergo a process of development oriented 
towards overcoming that existential deficiency, and to do so by way of a plethora of 
organizations and, writes Escobar, by way of “an endless number of practices.”29 These seek 
to orient developing nations consensually yet they do so more intrusively, more intimately, 
than the modes typical of the prior and more ‘formal’ imperialisms. Whilst this overall 
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  Ibid at 113. 
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  Anghie, “Law, Concepts”, supra note 22 at 725. 
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  Pope Francis, “Address”, supra note 5; Immanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority, 
translated by Alphoso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969) 87.  
28
  James Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key: Volume 2, Imperialism and Civic Freedom (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) chapter 5. 
29
  Arturo Escobar, “Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of his Work to 
the Third World” (1984) 10 Alternatives 377 at 387; and more particularly see the indispensible critical 
engagement provided by Celine Tan, Governance Through Development: Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
International Law and The Disciplining of Third World States (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 
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process can assume a large aspirational and programmatic range and secure a wide measure 
of acceptance, and whilst it adopts systematic and scientistic modes of operation, nonetheless 
it remains effectively diffuse. 
This combination of the diffuse with an infra-imperialism is revealed as more 
explicitly functional when the mantra of development comes to merge with that of a more 
expansive “governance” and especially so when that governance is filtered through 
Foucault’s “governmentality.”30 Governance has been  
…often defined as government without readily identifiable governors, and the 
study of global governance reveals that clear, transparent and hierarchical 
patterns of authority are typically lacking; indeed, the relative fall from grace of 
law as a normative order suggests much the same.
31
  
Leaving the redemption of law on one side for now, governance imports a mixitive collection 
of processes and organizations that have a singular efficacy yet do not have a conspicuous 
coherence, despite which this governance manages to project a systematic inevitability – 
something enhanced by its assumed factuality, normality and naturalness, by its being the 
way things are.  
This governance can be more revealingly rendered in terms of Foucault’s 
“governmentality,” a governing which would combine a pervasive governing of whole 
populations with tentacular and generalized disciplinary powers, including and especially the 
governing by, and disciplinary power of, the market.
32
 Such governmentality generates “the 
effect not of a consensus but of the materiality of power operating on the bodies of 
                                                 
30
  See e.g. Nicholas J. Kiersey, Doug Stokes and Jason R. Weidner, “Introduction” in Nicholas J. Kiersey and 
Doug Stokes, eds, Foucault and International Relations: New Critical Engagements (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011) xiii.  
31
  Jan Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen, “Normative Pluralism: An Exploration” Jan Klabbers and Touko 
Piiparinen, eds, Normative Pluralism and International Law: Exploring Global Governance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 13 at 28. 
32
  Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978,  translated 
by Graham Burchell (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 104, 108-109. In the account that follows 
Foucault’s work on biopower is drawn on as integral to governmentality even ‘though it seems he did not 
explicitly connect the two. 
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individuals.”33 And whilst it is identified with a tendency “throughout the West [that] has 
constantly led toward the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, 
discipline, and so on,” the role and force of disciplinary power is preserved, as is the force of 
a state sovereignty that takes on functional, even heightened significance.
34
 More 
expansively, the state serves in bringing to bear a “liberal reason...established as self-
limitation of government on the basis of a ‘naturalness’ of the objects and practices specific 
to government” including a naturalness of the economic.35 Still in this expansive vein, and 
like its vaporous cousin “global governance,” this naturalness characterizes an “economic 
world” that is “naturally opaque and naturally non-totalizable.”36 Thence no focal totality and 
no positive bound that could delimit it, even as a blank naturalness, can be called on to do so. 
Yet “the form of governmental technology we call liberalism...[has] its own self-limitation” 
as its objective.
37
 Liberal governmentality, then, assumes an illimitable capacity of self-
limitation. This fusion of the illimitable with the limitable enables “the delimitation of 
phenomena within acceptable limits.”38 And that illimitable range would extend to delimiting 
what is beyond the domain of what the self-limited may be at any one time – such as 
delimiting the underdeveloped of the earth. 
No matter what the ability of governmentality to ‘manage’ the relation between the 
illimitable and the delimited, that ability does not seem capable of endowing international law 
with a comprehensively cohering force or identity, much less with authority. 
Governmentality, like informal imperialism and governance, eludes any positively 
encompassing identity. In that way its embedding of empire remains ‘unseen’ and its 
putatively liberal, modern and post-imperial qualities are shielded from complicity. Further, 
with its immanent illimitability not tied to any positively encompassing identity, 
governmentality also eludes the transcendence deduced by Deleuze and Guattari and 
recounted earlier: “...whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to Something, we can 
                                                 
33
  Michel Foucault, “Body/Power” in Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977 (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1980) 55 at 55. 
34
  Foucault, Security, supra note 32 at 108-109. 
35
  Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979, translated by 
Graham Burchell (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) at 21-22, and see 297. 
36
  Ibid at 282. 
37
  Ibid at 297. 
38
  Foucault, Security, supra note 32 at 66. 
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be sure this Something reintroduces the transcendent.”39 Or at least almost eludes. Law is 
essential to liberal governmentality, and this is a law, whether national or international, 
generated considerably by national sovereigns.
40
 The state itself, as we saw, is involved in the  
managing of governmentality and provides, if elusively, the formative force of international 
law. In so doing it stakes its own claim to illimitability. 
Even more to the point, the national sovereign is self-constituted as illimitably 
immanent to itself as a delimited ‘something.’ It is caught in Deleuze and Guattari’s aperçu. 
Or, more bluntly and with Derrida, the sovereignty of the nation state remains “a theological 
inheritance.”41 Obviously, with the sovereign state being integral to a secular modernism, its 
deific dimension cannot be explicitly acknowledged, no more than there can be an explicit 
acknowledgement of that transcendent communion of sovereign states which would, as we 
saw earlier, be needed to form international law. In all, governmentality becomes an impasse 
and a puzzle. As impasse, it is of a secular modernity yet integrally dependent on deific 
substitutes. With the puzzle, it subsists as a nominate efficacy yet lacks any compendiously 
positive presence. 
Resolution – negation 
In all, not only are the unseen empires of governmentality unable to account for the 
positive coherence of international law, they also remain tied to the impossibility of 
extracting a modern, secular presence of international law from formations of the sovereign 
state. Yet each of the trio of governmentality, the sovereign state and international law 
assumes an operative coherence even as its assumption of a singular, positive presence 
remains impossible or incoherent. Perhaps then, such an assumption comes operatively from 
a presence negatively generated. That proposition signals a wider argument about the 
                                                 
39
  Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, supra note 13 at 45, their emphasis. 
40
  Foucault, Biopolitics, supra note 35 at 294-297. And see generally Ruth Buchanan and Sundhya Pahuja 
“Law, Nation, and (Imagined) International Communities” in Revathi Krishnaswamy and John C. Hawley 
eds, The Postcolonial and the Global (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008) 261 at 262; and 
Ben Golder and Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law (Abingdon: Routledge 2009) 33-35 and chapter 2. 
41 
 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, translated by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) 
105. 
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formation of an occidental modernism by way of a negative universal reference, but 
international law itself evokes a commensurate history of that reference.
42
 
It is at this point that Vitoria re-enters. The once subdued recognition of Vitoria as 
originating international law is changing to become something closer to primal.
43
 Vitoria, as 
we saw, subscribed to the universality of the ius gentium, and he did so in a way that would 
include “the American Indians.”44 Yet the all-inclusiveness of the ius gentium came with the 
utter exclusion that could be imperially visited on non-compliance by these Indians with 
some of its supposed tenets – excluded to the point of their elimination.45 This was a relation 
in which the ius gentium was not transformed into a ius inter gentes. Despite his vaunted 
concern for these Indians, Vitoria had “no doubt that force of arms were necessary for the 
Spaniards to maintain an imperial presence,” and not least so because of innate deficiencies 
of “the barbarians.”46  
There has to be, however, some hesitation in seeing Vitoria as elaborating “a new, 
secular, international law” even where that international law emerges as an imperial 
construct.
47
 Vitoria is indeed often hailed as secular and modern, yet he is also and often 
found to be resolutely religious and theological, and one of his main justifications for 
imperial appropriation was religious.
48
 Yet further, there is much to indicate that Vitoria 
occupies both sides of this apparent divide. Whilst Vitoria adhered comprehensively to the 
tenets of scholastic theology, including the supremacy of divine law, still for him the ius 
gentium, derived from Roman law, “has the validity of a positive enactment” – enacted by 
                                                 
42
  Peter Fitzpatrick, “Foucault’s other law” in Ben Golder, ed, Re-reading Foucault: On Law, (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2013) 39 at 46-49; and Buchanan and Pahuja, “Imagined, International Communities”,  supra 
note 40 at 464. 
43
  That origin could range more widely than it is usually taken: see Martti Koskenniemi, “Empire and 
International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution” (2011) 61 University of Toronto Law Journal 1.   
44
  Francisco de Vitoria, “On the American Indians (De Indis)” in Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, 
translated by Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 231, 283-282, 285-286. 
45
  Ibid at 282-283, 285-286, 291-292. 
46
  Ibid at 286 and e.g. 290-291. 
47
  Cf. Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 4 at 28. 
48
  Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance, “Introduction” in Vitoria, Political Writings, supra note 44 at xiii-
xv; Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013) at 14; as well as 
the striking instance provided in Anthony Pagden, The fall of natural man: The American Indian and the 
origins of comparative ethnology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) at 7-8. 
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“[t]he whole world, which is in a sense a commonwealth,” and resulting in a law that “[n]o 
kingdom may choose to ignore.”49 And whilst a kingdom can be a “perfect community...one 
in which nothing is lacking,” a formula that aptly accommodated the already formed 
‘sovereign’ states of Europe, still “the power of the sovereign clearly comes immediately 
from God himself, even though kings are created by the commonwealth.”50 And, a final; 
instance, whilst Vitoria in several ways resisted papal authority, his commitment to 
Catholicism was unwavering.
51
 
Unlike the monistic modern, Vitoria had the ‘mediaeval’ capacity to accord ultimate 
but related, even contesting, sources of power to “the Church” and to the “civil and lay.”52 As 
for law, much of the mediaeval period was characterised by a deep affinity between it and 
theology, an affinity in which the theological assumed an ostensible dominance. Yet the very 
inability of “human law” to “contradict divine law,” as Ullmann observes, serves to explain 
“why law in the Middle Ages assumed so crucial and over-riding a role… .”53 As “the prime 
vehicle by which government was to be exercised,” law could relate to a large responsive 
range by way of its “openness,” an openness needed because 
...in order to accommodate a great many divergent social systems the law had to 
manifest a corresponding flexibility so that it was if necessary, capable of 
absorbing alien matter. This capacity for absorption was particularly necessary in 
regard to non-Christian elements and usages.
54
 
Such law, Grossi would observe, was an “integrated plurality,” one in which law was “both 
unified and, at the same time, plural” – a feat that will be engaged with a little later.55  This 
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mediaeval law, responsive and plural, “became the most crucial and vital element of the 
whole social fabric.”56 
 Such a law could hardly be the torpid, ‘tradition’-tied entity so readily taken to 
characterize it. Nor could the society so closely tied to such a law suffer from the pervasive 
stasis routinely attributed to it. The mediaeval did not stop at some point and the modern 
supervene. Rather, there were numberless and “real...continuites.”57 To take a key instance, 
whilst secularism is exalted as modern in its rejection of a religiose Middle Ages, the 
mediaeval was both religious and secular – qualities combined yet also held distinct.58 
Further arrogations of the mediaeval can be extracted from another ‘origin’ of international 
law, one of an even more established variety than that offered by Vitoria, the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648. 
 As a contribution to the modernist mantra, Westphalia (to use the customary 
abbreviation) is hailed as the precipitate origin of a modern state system, and not only of the 
modern, secular states but also of the international law linking them. Crucially, as 
Koskenniemi notes, this society of independent states “would now arise from itself and not 
from any religious, moral or political notions of the good external to it.”59 That marvellous 
rising came from the constitutive rejection of an utter dependence on the religious and such 
foisted on mediaeval. Such self-elevation, Koskenniemi would add, embodied “the founding 
myth of the system,” and by now many studies have identified this mythic, fictive quality and 
revealed something of the opposite, revealed a dependence of such other “notions,” including 
the religious, as well as essential continuities with the mediaeval.
60
 In more condign terms, 
the conventional Westphalia becomes ‘history’ but as a retrospective and transcendent 
attribution, as a modernist history which, as Foucault would see such history, takes on “a 
suprahistorical perspective: a history whose function is to compose the finally reduced 
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diversity of time into a totality fully closed upon itself.”61 Or, in Latour’s more mellifluous 
terms, history as “a fine laminary flow,” a “beautiful order,” drawn out of and away from 
what is “a turbulent flow of whirlpools and rapids.”62  
        The outcome can be encapsulated in a continuity with the mediaeval, in the mediaeval 
conception of empire or Empire, a conception that invested the sovereign with imperial 
authority.
63
 With modernity, that authority is absorbed into a heightened territoriality which, 
as we also saw earlier, typifies the state, this being a “territorial order” which “became 
representative of a new order in international law.”64 This incorporation of the illimitably 
imperial into the territorially delimited provides, by way of a return to Deleuze and Guattari, 
an instance of that transcendence generated “whenever immanence is interpreted as 
immanent to Something.”65 This “sublimation of theology in the ‘world’,” as Kathleen Davis 
most aptly has it, is effected by “a political-theological tear” typified by the rupture between 
the mediaeval and the modern, a rupture “that paradoxically occupies a transcendent position 
by virtue of banishing transcendence.”66 Even as that rupture serves to found a diversity of 
sites of power, these still operate as an imperium attuned to uniform effect. The dictates of 
‘development,’ for example, are not attuned to diversity. The puzzle then becomes how that 
uniform effect is affirmed given the diffusion and elusion of its constituent powers. 
 Once the reliance on a focussed theological reference is no longer available 
explicably, the universality of the modern must be derived from elsewhere. That need is not 
met by the international order, or disorder, observed earlier. Not only was it found to be 
diffuse but, as rendered in Foucault’s terms, it would be characterised by plural modes of 
power that were “indefinite,” “without limit,” “never closed,” or “naturally opaque and 
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naturally non- totalizable.”67 Vitoria again obliges, at least in significant part. The ius gentium 
for Vitoria was both inclusive and exclusive. It included the barbarians but, as ius inter 
gentes, it excluded them. This seeming contradiction was, in a sense, resolved by holding out 
the prospect of inclusion, a remote redemption dependent on suitable transformations such as 
conversion to Christianity. Vitoria was, however and understandably, able to ascribe a largely 
religious dynamic to that combined process. The modern expedient is to adopt a like process 
as itself providing the dynamic, and to do so by way of that negative universal reference 
signalled at the outset of this present section. 
 A sampling of international law’s copious contributions to this negative universal 
reference could begin with the return to the standard-issue origin of Westphalia. From the 
point of its retrospective formation, one could observe with Walker that the “founding 
mythology” of Westphalia marked “a moment at which another world was ordained in 
opposition to” the modern; “a world, in part, deemed bereft of civilization and thus 
legitimately subject to colonial exploitation... .”68 The origin thence “repeat[s] itself 
originarily” by being set in a spatially realized universal constituted in the opposition to all 
that is deemed other to it, the content of a universal derived by its being not what the other is 
or by being what the other is not.
69
 There is, however, a pivotal aporia intrinsic to this 
situated universal which impels the negative reference beyond exclusion. Whilst an 
appropriated universal excludes utterly, still the universal has to be all-inclusive. Accounts of 
international law equating it with the civilized provide an indicative instance of both 
exclusion and inclusion. With the marker of civilization, there is historically both an overlap 
between and a shift from civilization as denoting absolute difference and civilization as the 
standard of a condition to be achieved by the excluded through ‘improvement’ or, later and 
constantly in the discourse of international law, by way of “progress.”70 There is also, and 
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eventually, a further shift from progress as an exemplary imperative to its becoming 
“disciplinary,” a formative and “controlling” discourse.71 Progress in this guise merges into a 
‘development’ characterized by tentacular regulation.72 And in taking elevated content from 
its being the contrary of underdevelopment, development typifies  the negative universal 
reference by elevating a universal norm through “the creation of ‘abnormalities’ such as the 
‘underdeveloped,’ … which it would later treat and reform.”73 That underdevelopment, as 
traced earlier, comes to merge with regimes of ‘governance’ and governmentality, regimes to 
do with security, with finance and investment, trade, and much more.            
 With this culmination, the disciplinary norm generalized through governmentality 
comes to bind the elect also, and it does do even as the norm remains constituently attuned to 
them. Formative concepts of, or brought to bear on, international law now adopt something of 
a positive universality yet still avoid confronting the secular imperative by sharing an 
invented facticity.
74
 Such a concept is denied ultimate attribution and “tends to become 
anonymous in order to attest to a truth imprinted in things.”75 Drawing on the repertoire 
already mentioned, the ‘human’ of human rights, the ‘community’ of the international 
community, along with ‘progress’ and ‘development’ as processes, all become ordered and 
ordering facts.  
 Given their burgeoning in international law, human rights can provide a summary 
instance ending this section. For Pagden, human rights are an “imperial legacy” functioning 
with a supposed international community “which is, in essence, a secularized transvaluation 
of the Christian ethic, at least as it applies to the concept of rights.”76 For Hopgood, the 
“humanism” that is “the cultural precondition for Human Rights...was a secular replacement 
for the Christian god.”77 In being abundantly set within international law against the 
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inhuman, the ‘human’ of human rights derives conceivable content from negation whilst still 
being inclusively universal. By way of such negation, this ‘human’ can avoid any positive 
imperial or theological ascription, an avoidance secured in the evasive facticity of the 
human.
78
 Yet, even as the negative universal reference can generate and affect international 
law and governmentality, it does not positively secure a coherent identity or an enforceability 
for either. 
Resolution: positive 
        The semantic search for the “inter-” at the outset saw that it denoted being “[b]etween or 
among other things or persons; between the parts of, in the intervals of, or in the midst of, 
something; together with,” a being “with each other; mutually and reciprocally.”79 A further 
search may situate this “something” within our present concerns. A plurality can be a simple 
plurality – a term denoting more than one, many – but the prime meaning given to “plurality” 
in the Oxford English Dictionary is “[t]he state of being plural; the fact or condition of 
denoting, comprising, or consisting of more than one.”80 This condition, this consisting and 
relating in and as a plurality, would for Donald Davidson “make sense...only if there is a 
common coordinate system on which to plot” the different entities relating plurally, “yet the 
existence of a common system belies the claim to dramatic incomparability.”81 This, 
however, is a compliant commonality which accommodates a seeming paradox of plurality. 
If, say, entities are to relate in and as a plurality in the sense of a being-together plurally, then 
the element in commonality cannot be only within each of them because this would leave 
them as a simple plurality, leave them in dissipation. So the commonality has to be, and be 
set, in some way determinately apart from them. Yet the determinate commonality cannot be 
so much apart from them in their singularity that it ceases to relate responsively to them – 
ceases constituently to absorb their changeful commonality. This commonality, then, is 
generated in yet another aporia. It has to be capable of vacating itself and changing in this 
responsiveness whilst enabling some determinate manifestation apart from itself. Even as that 
manifestation is enabled, it does not and cannot assume an invariant, much less 
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comprehensive, hold on the commonality. And what is manifest will always be partial and 
contingent on the ultimate plurality with-in the commonality.  
        Returning then to the engagement with governmentality, whilst its illimitability would 
be compatible with and sustained by the commonality with-in its plurality of sites of power, 
and even as its liberal and developmental dimensions involved some cohering of these 
diverse powers, still its operative existence entailed its not taking on an extensively 
generalized manifestation, much less some encompassing imperium. How then might it 
assume an operative connectivity and cohesion? To have a “common coordinate system,” to 
have an operative plurality, there has to be cohering connections between the entities relating 
plurally.
82
  That connection and cohesion can be provided by law. Returning to Foucault, the 
sites of power with-in governmentality and its sustaining disciplinary powers are linked 
through law as a commonality endowing them with form and force.
83
   
Yet, if this law is to contribute the positive resolution being sought in this section, 
closer inspection could question whether it can resolve anything at all. The issue is posed in 
this much-quoted passage by Koskenniemi: 
We have either chosen a formalism that insists on the law’s validity and binding 
nature irrespective of its distance from the world of political facts or we have 
become realists and stressed the law’s dependence on political facts and ridiculed 
“binding force” as a formalist fiction.84            
That impasse courses through Jurisprudence as a discipline but, being necessarily abrupt 
about it, the resolving response here is that in, and as, law each position is necessary for the 
other. There is inescapable point to the realists’ case. Law’s efficacy depends upon its 
receptive regard for what is ever beyond it. Yet, that responsiveness cannot be confined to 
“political facts” or indeed to any other avatar. Admittedly, and as we saw, international law 
could be reduced to, for example, European dimensions or the dimensions of a particular 
‘community.’ And as for dominance effected through governmentality, this is vividly echoed 
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in the influential perception that international law is now saturated by managerialism.
85
  Yet, 
even as necessarily abject, this law has to match, extend ever beyond, and delimit the 
illimitable, the non-totalizable quality of governmentality its constituent powers. Here, 
international law has to be at a “distance” from its sources, positioned apart in something of a 
distinct, self-sustaining “formalism.” If, in a realist perception, governmentality were 
somehow to subsume law comprehensively, it would need to subvert its own essential  
indefinition and take on a conspicuous coherence. 
 Seeing law in and as plurality may heighten and serve to generalise the significance of 
the link between formalism and realism. This could be done by evoking another continuity 
with the mediaeval – this time that of its law.  That law was an “integrated plurality” in which 
it was “both unified and, at the same time, plural.”86  Such a competence, as we saw, enabled 
law’s being open and receptive to radically divergent entities. That process, it could now be 
argued, in drawing on an ever incipient commonality, combined a realist involvement with a 
diversity and a formalist distancing apart from it. In this way, law endowed the commonality 
as diversity with determinate effect. Understandably enough then, law in the Middle Ages 
was accorded a “prime” governmental determinacy, “an over-riding...role.”87 
 Another return to the beginning: the “inter-” of international law may now help 
account for the surpassing force of that law. “[S]omething” that is “between the parts of, in 
the intervals of, or in the midst of” could now be seen as the commonality in and as 
plurality.
88
 This commonality takes on a manifest determinacy yet ever extends responsively 
beyond any determining domain. So, international law, as we saw, in many ways extended 
beyond its standard source in the delimited concordance of sovereign states. Returning to just 
one instance by way of illustration, the imperative force of jus cogens is intrinsic and cannot 
be countered by nation-states.  
Resistance 
            It may seem a little late to be coming to a focal concern of this essay, but perhaps it   
will become evident that the whole exercise was oriented towards resistance. We have 
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 encountered two types of resistance.   
 In what could be called the law implicate, and relating it integrally to 
governmentality, law gives determinate effect to the constituent powers of governmentality, 
both singularly and in some cohering relation. To do so it has to match the illimitability of 
those powers and of governmentality itself. As illimitable, this law embeds the possibility of 
resistance. The insistent realist may contend that, nonetheless, such law remains in thrall to 
governmentality, but that would be to ignore the intrinsic force of what could be called the 
law resistant. International law, in its alignment with a commonality of the ultimately plural, 
cannot be finally reduced to any source even as it functions to give a source determinate 
effect.  
 Likewise with international law conventionally. It derives constitutional content from 
nation-states yet ranges illimitably beyond that derivation, refusing subordination to it. Whilst 
that protean competence opens out to the possibility of resistance through international law, 
there is still an operative filtering through its existent constitution. Even so, international law 
still opens onto the prospect, borrowing from Derrida and his contributing a final 
‘something,’ a prospect of “something which would go beyond the current stage of 
internationality, perhaps beyond citizenship, beyond belonging to a state, to a given nation 
state.”89 
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